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1 DATA-REVOLUTION IN GB RAIL 
1.1 Big data and safety management in railways 
Computer scientists are quite clear in their belief that 
the data-revolution is coming of age. They have a 
firm belief that the enormous amounts of data float-
ing around in the internet will unchain a manage-
ment revolution of uncanny proportions (Chen et al. 
2012, McAfee & Brynjolffson, 2012; Watson & 
Marjanovic, 2013). Yet, to date, the potential benefit 
of this revolution is scantily investigated for safety 
and risk management.  
Big data is the label for methods and techniques 
that take advantage of the large amounts of data on 
the internet however, authors disagree on the exact 
definition (Davenport 2014, Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, 2013). The broad interpretation is that big 
data deals with huge volumes of a variety of data-
sources very quickly (volume, variety & velocity). In 
a narrower interpretation it is the next step in the de-
velopment of decision support tools. In practice big 
data describes cloud-computing software tools that 
combine structured and unstructured data sources to 
support (commercial) management decisions.  
In railway engineering some work was published 
about cloud computing and machine learning (Tan & 
Ai 2011; Li 2014; Thomas 2014). A particular area 
of interest is the acquisition of data with RFID sys-
tems (Yan & Yu 2009; Zhang & Tentzeris 2011; 
Makalar & Roy 2014; Kour et al. 2014). Although 
these works contain some references to safe opera-
tion, the do not deal with safety- or risk manage-
ment.  
This work investigates whether and how rail safe-
ty and risk management could benefit from a new 
generation of software tools that computer scientists 
develop today. This paper contributes to that aim by 
considering the initial experience gained in the 
BDRA research programme at the University of 
Huddersfield.  
1.2 Data strategy for the GB railways 
The choice for investigating whether the data-
revolution could benefit safety and risk for the rail-
ways in the UK is not a coincidence. The increased 
dependency on data is addressed in The Rail Tech-
nical Strategy Report 2012 (TSLG, 2012). The re-
port presents a vision for the GB railways for the 
next decade. The vision is based on the fact that the 
number of passengers on trains will continue to grow 
in the UK. With this growing demand, the railways 
have to ensure customer satisfaction and value for 
money by being safe, reliable, resilient, meeting ca-
pacity and being service oriented. Six innovation 
themes were defined to support these objectives: 
control, command and communication; energy; in-
frastructure; rolling stock; information and customer 
experience. These themes heavily depend on data. In 
support of these efforts Network Rail and ATOC 
have made relevant data-feeds available through the 
internet. 
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 ABSTRACT: Computer scientists believe that the enormous amounts of data in the internet will unchain a 
management revolution of uncanny proportions. Yet, to date, the potential benefit of this revolution is scantily 
investigated for safety and risk management. This paper gives a brief overview of a research programme that 
investigates how the new internet-driven data-revolution could benefit safety and risk management for railway 
safety in the UK. The paper gives a brief overview the current activities in this programme and infers whether 
big-data techniques provide a sensible addition to the safety and risk sciences. The overview shows that there 
is added value for introducing these techniques in the safety and risk domain but serious challenges need to be 
addressed. 
  
 Figure 1. Technical system for BDRA. 
 
1.3 RSSB 
RSSB is GB’s foremost rail risk analyst. It maintains 
the Safety Risk Model (SRM) and ensures that the 
data quality is maintained in the national incident da-
tabase SMIS. About two years ago, an additional in-
cident database was introduced that enables railway 
personnel to report so called ‘Close Calls’. RSSB 
has identified that maintenance and analysis of these 
databases and risk models is a meticulous task that 
could benefit from the modern big-data data-
analytics techniques (Bearfield et al. 2013). This 
work is connected to these efforts in the sense that it 
supports RSSB in their efforts to introduce data-
analytics into the SRM model and provides horizon 
scanning for future opportunities of data-analytics 
for rail safety and risk in the UK.  
1.4 Current projects  
This paper is written at a time that the Big Data Risk 
Analysis project is starting up at the University of 
Huddersfield. The research project is a joint effort by 
RSSB and the Institute of Railway Research at the 
University of Huddersfield. The objective is to in-
vestigate to what extent big data techniques can sup-
port the current risk model of RSSB and to investi-
gate whether the modern data-analytics methods will 
change traditional risk analysis methods, and if so, 
how. Therefore, this paper presents an overview of 
the activities rather than detailed scientific analysis; 
these are reported in other papers in this confer 
 
 
 
 
ence and elsewhere (Hughes & Figueres 2015, 
Hughes et al. in prep., Figueres et al. in prep.). This 
overview helps understand whether the big data ap-
proach is sensible for safety and risk sciences and 
how safety and risk management could benefit from 
it. This paper treats the design of a technical system 
for BDRA applications, a description of two projects 
with some of their results, a brief consideration 
about software design for integrated BDRA applica-
tions and a conclusion.  
 
 
2 TECHNICAL SYSTEM FOR BDRA 
 
There are three major components in the technical 
system for BDRA. They are a Hadoop computer 
cluster, industry servers containing databases, inter-
face devices and the Internet. Figure 1 depicts the 
system.  
2.1 Data in the GB railways 
The data servers of railway industry partners are de-
picted in the left of figure 1. The GB railway system 
depends on collaboration of many organizations in 
the railway industry including train operating com-
panies, infrastructure managers, rolling stock com-
panies, maintenance and construction companies, en-
forcement bodies, regulatory bodies and many more. 
Each of these companies assembles information 
about the railway system for their own purposes or 
to support the railway industry as a whole. Much of 
this information is stored on servers that contain da-
tabases, information about technical systems, safety 
management systems, documents and laws. These 
servers are owned by individual organizations but 
sharing some of that data could benefit BDRA appli-
cations. Network Rail and ATOC are currently 
providing access to live data-streams that feed live 
data about trains and tracks: BPLAN, Corpus, 
Movement, RTPPM, Schedule, SMART, TD, TSR, 
VSTP, Fares Data, Timetable Data and Routing Data 
(NR 2015, ATOC 2015). All these feeds carry safe-
ty-relevant data.  
  RSSB plays an important role in the sharing of 
safety-relevant information. Especially the SRM  
and the information gathered through the SMIS da-
tabase and the Close Call database provide key 
building blocks for BDRA. The current interpreta-
tion and analysis of these databases is based on well-
known analysis techniques where incident databases 
feed fault-tree models (Dacre 2014). 
Not all safety-relevant information is found on 
railway servers. The weather forecast or football 
matches would not typically be stored on railway 
servers but could be relevant for BDRA for GB rail. 
Since industry partners displayed a particular interest 
in these data-sources, they will be investigated in the 
near future.  
2.2 Central processing cluster 
Hadoop is the name of free software that combines 
the computing power of several commodity comput-
ers into a single processing cluster (White, 2012). 
Hadoop distributes data and algorithms over a num-
ber of commodity computers and collects the results 
after they have been processed. The software is ro-
bust in the sense that built-in redundancies protect 
against the loss of data by the failure of individual 
computers in the cluster. The use of commodity 
computers makes computer power cheap in the sense 
that the hardware can be bought from any computer 
supplier and even second-hand computers could be 
used. Though the maintenance of such a computer 
system requires the support from the ICT depart-
ment, significant computer power is in reach for all 
but the smallest organizations in the GB railway in-
dustry. In addition to that, Hadoop is extensively 
used by Big Data researchers around the world.  
  Since safety-relevant data is distributed over many 
different servers in the railway system it is unlikely 
that a single computer cluster will collect all the 
safety-relevant information. It is envisaged that the 
central Hadoop cluster will be supported by auxiliary 
Hadoop clusters owned by train operating compa-
nies.  
2.3 User interfaces 
To date we have experience with one user interface 
(for RAATS, see paragraph 3.1) and work on an ex-
tensive literature review which is published else-
where in this conference (Figueres et al. in prep.). 
We theorize that there will be three types of interfac-
es that safety experts recognize: safety-dashboards, 
mobile applications and warning systems.  
  Safety dashboards are based on safety indicators 
that are calculated from the data-sources. A dash-
board assists (safety) decision makers, enforcers, and 
analysts to assess the current safety-situation in the 
GB railways. Each indicator would be supplied by an 
individual BDRA application that works with dy-
namic data from live-feeds or static data from data-
bases. It is too early to report progress in this area 
but it is envisaged that the dashboard would be uni-
form throughout the GB industry. That is to say, 
there will only be one dashboard application that can 
be accessed by all GB railway industry partners. 
RSSB’s SRM and the safety indicators associated 
with it are the starting point for BDRA safety indica-
tors.  
  Mobile applications could present a safety dash-
board but more likely they are tools for entering da-
ta. At present, workers in the GB railways can use 
mobile applications to make a close call report. It is 
envisaged that mobile applications support a single 
group of workers, such as track workers. In contrast 
to the safety dashboard, many different mobile ap-
plications will be used to support different groups of 
workers in the GB railway industry.  
  The third application would be a relatively straight-
forward warning system. A warning system could 
give a heads-up for particular track sections when a 
storm is approaching or an automatic alerting system 
for the British Transport Police of rising crime rates 
at particular train stations. Again, it is envisaged that 
alarm systems would derive their information from 
the dashboard but would only target relevant groups 
of workers. Though these systems seem conceptually 
straightforward, the development of a reliable soft-
ware application is challenging.  
3 INITIAL BDRA APPLICATIONS 
As this paper sticks to an overview of activities it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to give a complete 
description of the BDRA tools; this is reported else-
where (Stow et al. 2015, Hughes & Figueres 2015, 
Hughes et al. in prep., Figureres et al. in prep.). A 
brief description of the applications provides insight 
in two fundamentally different developments.  
3.1 RAATS 
An event where a train passes a signal showing a red 
stop aspect without authorization is known as a ‘sig-
nal passed at danger’ (SPAD). SPADs can range  
Figure 2. RAATS GUI showing signal ET776. 
 
 
from minor incidents where a signal is passed by on-
ly a few meters to a collision between fully loaded 
passenger trains. Following a fatal accident at Lad-
broke Grove in 1999 in which there were 31 fatali-
ties (HSE, 2000), the GB rail industry made signifi-
cant efforts to reduce the rate of SPADs.  
SPAD risks are analyzed using a process which 
examines the potential consequences of passing a 
particular signal at danger. A weakness in the analy-
sis was that it is unknown how many times trains 
approach a signal when it is displaying a red aspect. 
This project addresses that shortcoming by analyzing 
live data from signaling systems.  
The source of the information used in the RAATS 
software is Train Describer (TD) data (NR, 2015). A 
Train Describer is an electronic device connected to 
each signaling panel which provides a description of 
each train (its ‘headcode’) and which section of track 
(or ‘track section’) it currently occupies. RAATS 
software reads the TD live-feed, stores it in a data-
base, calculates which trains actually approach a red 
aspect and presents the data in a graphical interface 
or creates an excel file for further analysis. The red 
approaches to a single signal can be analyzed over a 
period from a single day to a period of a year. Alter-
natively the user can choose to analyze all signals in 
an area or indeed all the signals in the database.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the RAATS user interface. The 
pie chart shows the results for a single signal: ET776 
which is located on the up Cowdenbeath line at Red-
ford. The figure shows that at 23%, of trains ap-
proach the signal at red in the period of the 17th of 
August 2014 to the 13th of October 2014 which is a 
high percentage compared with the average. The bar 
chart shows the signals with the highest train ap-
proach frequencies (top ten) in the EA signaling area 
in Edinburgh (bottom left: Select TD). The names of 
the signals are not visible in this figure.   
In this way, RAATS software provides intricate 
details about the number of trains approaching a sig-
nal at danger. This information can be used in sub-
sequent risk analyses for signals. RAATS adds value 
to safety on the GB railways by analyzing a (large) 
live data feed which makes it a BDRA application.  
3.2 Automated analysis of Close Calls 
A close call is a hazardous situation where the event 
sequence could lead to an accident if it had not been 
interrupted by a planned intervention or by random 
event (Gnoni et al. 2013). Network Rail workers and 
specific sub-contractors within the GB railway in-
dustry are asked to report such events in the ‘Close 
Call’ database. Close call reports are freeform text 
reports where anyone can enter a situation that, in 
their view, could have led to an accident. This leaves 
the reporter with more freedom to report what they 
think are dangerous situations and could, in theory, 
lead to a richer data-source for railway safety issues. 
The Close Call Database contains approximately 
150,000 entries that were collected over a period of 
two years. Due to the large number of records, it is 
impractical to manually review the records and 
therefore computer-based techniques have been de-
veloped to extract safety relevant information from 
them. 
Since the key information relevant to safety man-
agement is found in the free text computer assisted 
analysis of freeform text is used: Natural Language 
Processing or NLP. NLP techniques have been an 
emerging area of study over the past two decades 
road safety and medicine (Allen 1994, Wu and Hey-
decker 1998, Dale et al. 2000, Xu et al. 2009). One 
of the key problems is the inherent ambiguity in 
written language. These include jargon, abbrevia-
tions, misspelling and lack of punctuation. Pro-
cessing of close call data by extracting information 
from free text involves five processes (Hughes & 
Figueres, 2015): 
• Text cleansing, tokenizing, and tagging;  
• Ontology parsing and coding (creation of a taxon-
omy of related words);  
• Clustering (creation of groups of records that are 
semantically similar);  
• Text analysis; 
• And information extraction.  
As this process description suggests, a sensible au-
tomated text analysis is complicated. The exact pro-
cedure is described elsewhere and reported in a pa-
per in this conference (Hughes et al. 2015). This 
paper highlights two results of the information ex-
traction process.  
The first information extraction process was the 
identification of incidents with track workers. The 
SMIS database (reportable incident database) shows  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequencies of Workforce incidents in SMIS and 
Close Call. 
that incidents with track workers take place more 
frequently in the hours between 11:00 and 15:00. 
   This analysis was performed to investigate whether 
the same pattern is present in the close call database. 
An automated search query was programmed to re-
trieve the protection/possession arrangements events 
in the close call database as function of time-of-day. 
The results are compare with track worker near miss 
events in the SMIS database as function of time-of-
day (voluntary reporting of dangerous situations) and 
with all events in the close call database as a func-
tion of time-of-day. 
   The relative distributions of these events by time 
of day are shown in figure 3. The figure illustrates 
that the SMIS incident database and close call re-
ports follow similar trends during the day. Unfortu-
nately, the times at which reports are made trend for 
all close calls are similar to the times reports are 
made for protection arrangements, which suggests 
that reporting bias may interfere.  
 The high fraction of close call events between 
00:00 and 01:00 is due to a default of the reporting 
system that sets the time-stamp to 00:00 when the 
time of the incident is not entered by the person 
making the entry. This correction is made more fre-
quently with the close call database than the SMIS 
database since there is less quality control on close 
call reports.  
 A similar problem was investigated in relation to 
trespassing: do trespasses take place at certain times 
of the day or do they take place with equal probabil-
ity throughout a 24 hour period? Figure 4 shows the 
frequency of occurrence for trespass based on auto-
mated identification of trespass events in the close 
call database. Note that trespass does not occur with 
equal probability. Though trespasses occur in each 
hour of the day, the trend seems that they occur more 
frequently during working hours. What causes this 
trend is as yet unexplained but similar to the posses-
sion entries, reporting bias may play a role.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Frequency of trespass as function of time-of-day.  
 
3.3 Reflection on application development 
RAATS and the close call analysis were initiated to 
investigate whether computer scientists’ enthusiasm 
for the data-revolution is transferrable to rail safety  
for the GB railways. Two very different applications 
were selected on the basis that they are very different 
in nature. RAATS is an application that utilized live 
feeds to infer real-time safety information from In-
ternet-based sources. This project demonstrates that 
sensible safety information can be derived from the 
live feeds currently available in GB. Since the soft-
ware mostly deals with a numeric data-feed, it is rel-
atively easy to comprehend the data and to design 
software for it. Yet, developing sensible software is 
a laborious process. 
 The close call project has proven to be a more 
complicated challenge. It involves cutting edge text-
analysis methods, which are still under development 
in the computer sciences: NLP techniques and ma-
chine learning have not led to standardized software 
tools that can easily be implemented for safety and 
risk management. Despite that automated analysis of 
free text in the close call database showed that useful 
safety information can be obtained by automated text 
analysis. This allows freedom for reporters to ex-
press their safety concerns whilst searching for par-
ticular risks remains straightforward. This flexibility 
allows for rapid data-searches which supports hy-
pothesis testing and the identification of new, or 
previously unknown, risk factors. Similar findings 
were reported by Taylor et al. (2014).  
 The experience that was gained by developing 
these initial tools and the information that was un-
locked by them shows promise for the future of on-
line data analytical safety and risk techniques. It also 
shows that an integrated risk dashboard for the GB 
railway as a whole is still a long way off. 
4 SOFTWARE DESIGN FOR BDRA 
The experience with initial BDRA tools demonstrat-
ed a need for a new approach to the BDRA software 
architecture that would address major challenges re-
lated to component technologies and data properties.  
Considering relevant relevance materials (e.g. Cohen 
et al. 2009, Sadashiv & Kumar 2011, Davenport 
2014) and known best practices in defining architec-
tures for new technologies, such as NIST Cloud 
Computing Reference Architecture, Intercloud Ar-
chitecture Framework, and recent discussions by the 
NIST Big Data Working group, we have emphasized 
four components that address BDRA system: 
• Data models, structures, types 
• Data management, provenance, archiving 
• Data analytics tools: BDRA software applica-
tions, visualisation, presentation 
• BDRA infrastructure, including storage, 
computational power, network, operational 
support 
It is likely that all data-feeds that are available today 
carry safety-relevant information and many more da-
ta-feeds might have to be monitored in the future. 
We expect that each data-feed would have a similar 
live-feed reading capability as RAATS and close call 
have today so the software for reading the live feeds, 
databases and incident entries could grow. In this 
approach, there would probably be a software layer 
that is exclusively dedicated to data-input pro-
cessing. The subsequent analysis of the input data 
takes place in a second software layer. This layer 
may be based on applications and services the fol-
lowing data centric applications have to be consid-
ered: Hadoop related services and tools, cluster ser-
vices, databases, NoSQL, parallel processing 
databases. Some of these tools are offered by the ma-
jor cloud providers, such as Elastic Map Reduce, 
Dynamo, IBM Big Data Analytics, Cloudera howev-
er at this development stage we need to understand 
the overall architectural requirements. For this rea-
son, the work is currently based on an in-house Ha-
doop cluster which makes it easier to control and 
understand software architectures. Decisions that 
have to be taken are mostly aimed at database archi-
tecture, communication protocols and perhaps pro-
gramming language.  
 The software layer that deals with output and in-
terfaces with the user is the least clear at this point in 
time. As part of the research programme 300 rele-
vant research papers have been identified about this 
issue. The first results from that literature review 
process seem to indicate that the application of In-
formation Visualization (InfoVis) systems to big da-
ta is not clear and new challenges are emerging. 
(Figueres et al. in prep.). Apart from that, visualiza-
tion techniques are not just used for representation of 
results, they can also play a part in selection of data-
sets, representation of ontologies and software-
monitoring tools. But the problem becomes more 
challenging when visualization techniques have to 
be tuned by safety experts and decision makers be-
cause it involves in-depth understanding of psychol-
ogy and risk. 
The BDRA system being developed today is 
shown in Figure 1. To address computational time 
issues we build our initial BDRA analytics on a Ha-
doop cluster as a scalable solution for future growing 
data demands. Given that many software architecture 
design factors are still under consideration another 
system may be adopted in the future.  
5 CONCLUSION 
This work investigates how the new internet-driven 
data-revolution could benefit safety and risk man-
agement for railway safety in the UK.  
Though computer scientists are quite clear in their 
belief that the data-revolution will unchain a man-
agement revolution of uncanny proportions there 
does not seem to be a straightforward implementa-
tion for managing safety and risk. Two initial pro-
jects show that the data-analytical approach to rail-
way risk analysis shows promise but the design of a 
smoothly operating integrated safety information 
system is not straightforward.  
The RAATS project demonstrates that sensible 
safety information can be derived from live-feeds 
but the contribution is limited to part of the risks in 
the railways. Since RAATS is based on a numeric 
data-feed it is similar to technical risk analysis tools 
based on databases or RFID data. In that sense, it 
adds little additional knowledge to the safety and 
risk sciences. The close call project uses tools that 
are traditionally associated with computer science ra-
ther than safety and risk sciences. It demonstrates 
that it is not straightforward to extract safety lessons 
from free text data. Despite that, it is possible to 
support safety analysts to answer hypotheses such as: 
“trespass is equally probable throughout the day” 
The authors believe that this particular line of inves-
tigation could add new tools to safety and risk analy-
sis in the future, for instance for the automatic classi-
fication of incidents in databases, for selecting 
relevant incident investigation reports in relation to 
particular safety threats and for the automatic identi-
fication of new safety risks based on text-searches 
alone. Yet the development of reliable tools will 
probably take quite some time. 
In conclusion, the tools that are currently devel-
oped in computer science will yield useful new tools 
for safety and risk management in the GB railways 
and in other risk domains. But the road to reliable 
computer systems for automated data-analytic tech-
niques for safety and risk is not straightforward. It 
requires novel risk analysis techniques, automated 
linguistic tools, dedicated computer systems and 
sensible interface-techniques; many of which have to 
be researched in dedicated collaboration projects be-
tween safety scientists, information technologists, 
software developers and railway engineers. The au-
thors share the optimism that computer scientists 
have for big data, albeit in a much milder form.  
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